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The Messianic Idea, the Time of Capital and the Everyday 
Large William 
 
This was the purpose of the experiment. 
To throw emissaries into time. To call 
past and future to the rescue of the 
present. 
Chris Marker, La Jetée 
Is there not something vaguely disingenuous and repulsive about pilfering the treasure 
chests of religion in order to come up with ideas, when you do not have the slightest 
faith yourself? You read Levinas, Rosenzweig, Scholem and Cohen, for example, on 
the idea of the Messianic, but you do not believe in the Messiah at all, and cannot 
imagine you ever will. At the same time, however, you do not agree with Negri’s 
judgment, when he is entirely dismissive of this idea. Writing on the Messianic in 
Benjamin’s ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’ in his book Time for Revolution, he 
says ‘this conception is ruinous’ (Negri, 2003, p. 112). He believes this because he 
interprets the ‘now time’ (Jetzt-Zeit) of Benjamin’s Messianism to be no different from 
the time of capital. This identification is completely wrong. Both because it identifies 
the time of capital with Messianic time, but also because it thinks of this time as 
mystical, as appealing to a ‘beyond’ which is outside of the ordinary experience of 
time. What is outside, however, is never the same as a ‘beyond’, which is why 
Benjamin is not a mystic, nor the Messianic opposed to the everyday. Perhaps, then, 
when it comes to the Messianic, and any other religious concepts or ideas, you do not 
have to believe them, if belief means appealing to a ‘beyond’. We might say, rather, 
‘how does the idea of the Messianic make sense of our ordinary experience of this 
world?’ Because this is the first thing that strikes you about idea of the Messianic (at 
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least in its Jewish origin and not its Christian reformulation): it concerns this world and 
not any other. 
There are two ways one can understand religious ideas. You can investigate them 
dispassionately as mummified relics of the past, whose interest to us is only academic, 
or you can think of them as living ideas because they still speak to us. So quite the 
opposite to Negri, I shall argue that the idea of Messianic is important because it does 
allow us to think against the hegemony of capital, and it does so precisely because it 
offers us a different image of time. Like Negri, I too, first of all, want to go back to 
Benjamin’s description of the Messianic, but unlike him I shall then retrace its source in 
Judaism. I will end, finally, on the theme of the everyday and moods in Virno and 
Blanchot, which is why I understand the Messianic (or at least one version of it in 
Judaism) to be quite the opposite of the mysticism which Negri fears has contaminated 
some aspects of Marxism. 
My argument is that there are three conceptions of the future: one, the 
fantastical future of capital which is endlessly postponed (‘empty time’, Benjamin calls 
it); the real time which this fantasy conceals, the destruction both of individuals and the 
planet; finally, Messianic time which is the resistance to this fantasy as the recognition 
of the disaster. By the word ‘recognition’ here, I do not mean ‘acceptance’. It is the 
recognition of the disaster in one aspect only: the indeterminacy of time which is its 
possibility, and which is also the source of any emancipatory promise. Only in this 
sense are the idea of the Messianic and the catastrophe close together. Both have their 
source in the promise of time, but they stand to that promise in a different way. The 
difference is that the Messianic demands justice. In essence it is political, and all 
politics that is open both to justice, and the time out of joint which makes it possible, is 
Messianic. To believe one needs a catastrophe in order for the Messianic era to arrive 
(Millenarianism in all its forms) is still to belong to a linear conception of time, and 
therefore, paradoxically speaking, not to be Messianic at all. 
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1. Capitalism and Religion 
Perhaps there is a more intimate relation between capitalism and religion than I have 
intimated in the opening paragraphs. Is religious belief a false problem, if it is no longer 
a question of assenting to a belief at all? We are not asked to believe in capitalism, but 
in important ways it functions as a religion.1 This is not just because, as Weber 
famously asserts, Protestantism is a key precursor for its development, but it too is a 
religion of a particular kind having its own pieties, rituals and gods. It is, as Benjamin 
describes it, in a small fragment ‘Capitalism and Religion’ (which was never published 
in his lifetime), a cult (Benjamin, 2004). As a cult, it invades our everyday lives 
invisibly. Capitalism becomes the mysterious force supposedly sustaining our lives 
without question, and money the god we must all worship. 
If capitalism has replaced religion (not because it is secular but because it is the 
most powerful of all religions), then it is a religion whose form is specific, Benjamin 
argues, even if it is no longer felt as such. It makes guilt all pervasive and this is its 
fundamental religious emotional tonality. ‘Guilt’, in German (die Schuld), also means 
‘debt’. We did not have to have had experienced the recent collapse of finance capital 
(though it has made it more vivid for us), to know that capitalism only functions on 
credit. The other side of credit is debt, and it is always the debt of the poor which pays 
for the credit of the rich, whether the poor is the ‘third world’ in the centres of 
capitalism (the ‘ghettos’ within every city) or the periphery of globalisation itself (what 
is euphemistically called the ‘developing world’). You have to get into to debt because 
you must consume. This is the unspoken religious commandment of capitalism.  
The proximate cause of the current financial crisis is the sub prime market in 
America, but what is concealed in this cause is a general conception of time which is 
 
 
1 This has been thesis of Philip Goodchild’s recent work. As he writes in Capitalism and Religion, ‘If 
God is dead, he is replaced by time and money, not man – there are still transcendent sources of meaning 
and value that exceed thought and experience, even if they can take the most banal forms.’ [emphasis in 
the original] (Goodchild, 2002, p. 133)  
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valid for capitalism as whole. If to consume you have to get into debt, then the fantasy 
which sustains the cycle of consumption is that this debt can be endlessly postponed. 
Occasionally reality bites back and the relation between credit and debt becomes 
unbalanced, but even a balanced financial market (an impossible ideal) only the masks 
the deeper illusion of capitalism that the future will never arrive and this postponement 
can be postponed permanently. Hidden within this fantasy is the real material 
destruction which makes possible endless debt in the short period, and impossible over 
the longer one. It is one of the precise functions of this fantasy to conceal this outcome. 
The circulation of capital becomes detached from reality such that we believe it has 
become its own origin and the origin of reality as well (such that we can no longer 
conceive of what might be its alternative). This is the source of the religious power of 
capital. ‘Forces and agents,’ as Deleuze and Guattari write in Anti-Oedipus, ‘come to 
represent a miraculous form of its own power: they appear to be “miraculated” 
(miraculés) by it.’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1984, p. 10) The only way to dispel this sorcery 
and bewitchment is by pointing to the reality it conceals: the real future waiting to 
happen beneath the marketing of the future. ‘Capitalism,’ Benjamin writes, ‘is entirely 
without precedent, in that it is a religion which is not the reform of existence, but its 
complete destruction.’ (Benjamin, 2004, p. 289) 
 
2. Global Destruction 
The real future of capitalism is imminent global catastrophe. ‘They have ruined the 
world,’ Korin says, the main character in Krasznahorkai’s novel War and War, and 
continues, ‘they have ruined everything they’ve managed to get their hands on, and by 
waging an endless treacherous war of attrition they have managed to get their hands on 
everything, ruined everything—seized it, ruined it and carried on in this way until they 
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had achieved complete victory, so that it was one long triumphal march of seizing and 
ruining.’ [Emphasis in the original] (Krasznahorkai, 2006, p. 260).2 
Perhaps this future has already happened and we simply have not caught up 
with it yet, just as capitalism had done so before anyone ever knew, sweeping  through 
existing feudal societies and destroying everything in its wake. It is a future produced 
by the ecological contradiction at the heart of capitalism, because the cycle of credit and 
debt is infinite, but the physical resources it depends upon are finite. Capitalism is the 
illusion money can be created out of thin air, but in the end there is always something 
real sustaining it, and the effects of capitalism on this reality are calamitous. We know 
that global warming is happening because of the burning of fossil fuels and 
deforestation. This is not an abstraction and it cannot be postponed into an ideal future 
which will never arrive. The question is not whether but when. The effects of global 
warming, however, are utterly unpredictable. As the report by the Royal Society 
‘Climate Change’ (which is the summation of scientific opinion in the UK) asserts, we 
cannot know when it will happen. It could happen today or many years from now 
(Royal Society, 2005). Nor do we know what effects these changes will have on 
resources and population. The time of capital is fundamentally at odds with the non 
linear time of reality, where the property of an effect is non-proportionally related to its 
cause. It thinks you can always plan yourself out of a crisis, because they never happen 
as such, since by some miraculous conjunction of time, a technology will reach us at the 
very moment we need it most. 
The myth of capitalism is that progress is infinite and any unforeseen danger 
can be alleviated, but the threshold between stability and instability, in this case, is 
wholly unpredictable. Nothing might happen for years and we might be able to find the 
 
 
2 This monologue is one long lament without paragraphs (always a good sign in a novel), and there really 
is no way to quote it fully. These are the opening words of the monologue, and my cut is arbitrary. You 
must read it for your self. Krasznahorkai, and his friend the film maker Béla Tarr, are the true artists of 
the apocalypse of capitalism. 
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alternative technology to replace fossil fuels, or the catastrophe might be right around 
the corner. What is certain is that no civilisation can survive without climatic 
equilibrium, but when we look at the ice core records from Greenland, then uncertainty 
is more certain that certainty. What is unique to our era (the last 8000 years) is that the 
climate has been peculiarly consistent, but there is no reason for this to continue (Cox, 
2005). Added to this uncertainty is the effect of an increase in global temperature (the 
average surface temperature of the Earth as risen 2 to 3 °C this century) on the climatic 
system as a whole. The smallest change might have the most catastrophic effect over a 
relatively small time period. None the less, we carry on as though time were linear, as 
though the future could be postponed in a present extending forever, and we can plan 
for whatever outcome. Such complacency has its source in the time of capital itself, 
where the future is only ever a continuation of the present through the calculation of 
risk and the only apparent worthwhile question is whether the reward in the present for 
us is worth what others will pay in the future.3 
 
3. Benjamin’s Angel 
So we might as well say the disaster has already happened and we are only waiting for 
the effects to catch up with us. The real future has already intervened to rupture the 
bubble of the fantasy of the cyclical time of credit. But is time just a conveyor belt of 
instants in which we are just thrown into the ruins of a dead civilisation and dying 
planet? Is all this unstoppable and inevitable? Despite Negri’s scepticism, such an 
interrupted time is precisely what is present in Benjamin’s ‘Theses on the Philosophy of 
History’ in what he calls ‘a weak messianic power’ (eine schwache messianische Kraft) 
 
 
3 The paradox is that the more we risk the less we are in control. Added to the possible changes to the 
climate because of global warming, is the effect of reaching peak production in oil, which is the major 
cause of climatic change in the first place (Roberts, 2004). As people struggle for less and less resources, 
then conflicts across the world can only increase and political instability will be the norm. It has already 
been calculated that we have exceeded the capacity of the planet to support us (Wackernagel & et al., 
2002). 
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(Benjamin, 1999, pp. 244–55). In these fragments, Benjamin argues against a 
conception of time as continuous and homogeneous, which he associates with all those 
who believe in the objectivity of history and progress, where the present infinitely 
extends out of the past into an empty future. The task of the historian is merely to record 
the facts and events which stand on this featureless plane. Such a time is not scientific 
or objective, but capitalist. It is the time of the production line which has been placed at 
the level of knowledge. True historical time is not continuous and homogeneous, but 
discontinuous and heterogeneous. This time is both political and Messianic. The 
historian does not stand to time indifferently, as one event happening after another, but 
seizes from time the possibility of a different future other than the one supposed to be 
inevitable. The true significance of the past is only what leaps out of time and such 
moments can redeem the present for us as the repetition of past in the future. Time is not 
an infinite series of ‘now points’ in which our experience is suspended, but a virtual 
past in which the sparks of different futures are visible to the one who can see them. The 
past is not just what has happened but exists in the present as its future. It affects the 
present as the permanently possibility of the state of things being entirely different from 
what they are. In this way, events can be snatched out of the continuum of time. We can 
change time. We can demand that time, this time, be on the side of the vanquished and 
not the victors. Any politics which seeks justice in this world, which does not see time 
as the inevitable progress of an indifferent force, must be Messianic, no matter how 
weak this power is. 
Famously in ‘The Theses on the Philosophy of History’, Benjamin describes a 
picture (which he owned) of an angel by the painter Klee called the Angelus Novus to 
illuminate this other meaning of history. He imagines the angel blown by a storm out of 
Paradise. This storm is what we call progress. It sees it as one single catastrophe piling 
up beneath its feet as it is flung backwards into empty time. It is not this angel of history 
which is the Messiah, nor even the foretelling of the Messiah. For its face is only turned 
towards the past. What the angel sees is what is hidden by the ideology of progress. It is 
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the truth of our history, but not the truth of history. The empty time of the future is 
merely the cradle of the disaster. What would it mean to see time differently? The 
future is not empty and the present is not the addition of one event on top of another. 
Rather, the present is always full of other possibilities which are not part of the present 
state of things. This other present, all these other possibilities which have been nullified 
by the actual (but in which the actual itself has to have its origin), exists virtually in the 
Messianic future. It is to see in every instant a different possibility. ‘For every second of 
time,’ as Benjamin writes of the Jews, ‘was the strait gate through which the Messiah 
might enter.’ (Benjamin, 1999, p. 255) 
 
4. The Messianic Idea 
The future is not an empty void, nor the endless repetition of what has already 
happened, but the creation of the new at the edge of time. It is a present political 
actuality. The idea of the Messianic is essential temporal. It is to conceive of the future 
as an interruption rather than as progress. Capitalism robs us of the time in the present 
for the sake of a future which will never arrive but does so by hiding the real future of a 
catastrophe. Capitalism is the latest version of cyclical time, where the past and the 
future are held together in the endless cycle of the same. It is a new version of 
paganism. 
We contrast this time with the time of the infinite. Infinite time is not the same 
as the eternal present of time. The infinity of the future, the creativity of time, is not the 
same as the eternal empty time of the present. The first time is turned to the closure of 
the past, as though the present was simply the past frozen into a homogeneous unity 
(the past is the merely the remorseless unchanging passing of one event after the other). 
The second time is opened towards the future, which is infinitely productive and 
constantly renewed. This is why the Jewish idea of the Messianic is not eschatological, 
as it is in Christianity. The latter image of time is still linear. The Messiah returns at the 
end of time in a future which has already happened placed outside of time: a future 
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which is strictly speaking timeless, like the circulation of capital. Such a future is quite 
different from a future as the pregnant possibilities of the present, which do not belong 
to the status quo, but is a new time within present time.4 
The future is not other than the present, not an empty time in which the present 
continually falls, so as to become frozen in a past without change or difference, but the 
present redeemed in this and every moment. This is why in some forms of Hasidism it 
is said that the age of the Messiah has already arrived and our duty is to not to wait for 
the end of time, but to bring time to an end. The myth of a Golden Age at the end of time 
is exactly the opposite of Messianic time, since it secretly harbours the belief that the 
present cannot be redeemed, so it projects the redeemed present into a mythical future 
that will not happen, and which is beyond this world.5 Rather then a ‘beyond’, the 
Messianic is always an actuality. Rather than the past being frozen in eternity, it is the 
memory of those moments which were already opened to another future yet to come 
and still to come in the present. This is an alternative history and a history of 
alternatives which cannot be conceived if history is only the catalogue of what has 
happened rather than what is still to happen. 
The future emerges from the void of being (the difference between the virtual 
and actual) through action. It is not the projection of time onto a past or a future beyond 
it. Eschatology, on the contrary, is the accomplishment of time in an eternity 
transcending it. The eschaton today is capitalism: the future that will not happen 
 
 
4 Levinas imagines this future as fecundity. Messianic time is the time of the child whose future is both 
mine and not mine. ‘The relation with the child - that is, the relation with the other, not power but 
fecundity - establishes relationship with the absolute future, or infinite time. [...] Fecundity continues 
history without producing old age. Infinite time does not bring an eternal life to an aging subject; it is 
better across the discontinuity of generations, punctuated by the inexhaustible youths of the child.’ 
[Emphasis in the original. Translation modified] (Levinas, 1969, p. 268) 
 
5 ‘This is the great cultural and historical riddle which Messianism poses. All peoples transfer the Golden 
Age into the past, into the primeval time; only the Jewish people hopes to see in the future the 
development of mankind. Messianism alone maintains the development of the human race, while the 
Golden Age represents the idea of a decline. […] In Messianism past and present disappear in the face of 
the future, which exclusively makes up the consciousness of time.’ (Cohen, 1995, pp. 289–90) 
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(eternal circulation of capital) in the time of the catastrophe (global destruction and 
permanent war). It is the eternal present without a future since it destroys the future in 
two ways: first, by projecting the future into a beyond (this is the religion of capitalism, 
infinite debt endlessly postponed); second, the real future it is actuality producing, the 
state of things in the present, which is concealed by the illusory future, is the total 
destruction of everything. 
 
5. The Everyday 
Scholem tells us that the content of the Messianic idea is very precise. It contains two 
elements: the restorative and the utopian (Scholem, 1995, p. 3). Restorative time is the 
projection of an ideal past into the future, and utopian, the arrival of the future to come, 
which comes not so much from the past, but from the future of the future itself. These 
are two tendencies within the Messianic. They are not opposed to one another, but 
always present to some extent or other in any kind of Messianism. Benjamin’s weak 
Messianic power, for example, is more restorative than utopian, but nonetheless it is 
still utopian to some degree, since it looks to the future in then past. Against a pure 
utopianism, he speaks at the end of the fragments of a prohibition in Judaism against 
prophecy of the future. ‘We know,’ he writes, ‘that the Jews were prohibited from 
investigating the future.’ (Benjamin, 1999, p. 255). Be that as it may, whether in strong 
or weak Messianism, the future always breaks into the present rather than fulfilling it. 
There is no historical progression towards Messianic time. It is not a fulfilment of 
history, but its fracturing. Messianic time is not teleological but transcendent. It is, as 
Scholem writes, ‘transcendence breaking into history, an intrusion in which history 
itself perishes, transformed in its ruin because it is struck by a beam of light shining into 
it from an outside source.’ (Scholem, 1995, p. 10) 
Perhaps it would not be possible for Benjamin to speak of such a transcendence 
in a direct way. Even Scholem at the end of his essay seems to think that such an 
extraordinary or meta-historical meaning of Messianism is no longer possible since 
  11 
   
Israel has entered the history of nations.6 Is there a way of thinking this transcendence 
in a differently not as exterior but interior, as a kind of broken immanence? My answer 
to this question is through the everyday. The Messianic inhabits our everyday lives, but 
it does so not from a ‘beyond’ but as an outside. What is ‘outside’ is not exterior if we 
think of the exterior as coming from a different place. On the contrary, what is outside 
is the most interior, more interior than any place. It is what disrupts every place. In the 
relation between capital and life, life is the outside, but this outside inhabits capital 
from the very inside. Capitalism presents itself as the very origin of life, but the truth is 
the reverse, life is the very condition of capitalism. There is no external opposition 
between them. Post-Fordist capitalism has to directly appropriate the capacities and 
abilities of individuals in order to produce surplus value, but in order to do so, it has to 
exist at the very heart of the everyday. This would mean that any resistance to 
capitalism, any internal difference to its power and influence, must itself happen within 
the everyday, and must do so all the time, because it is life which is the surplus and not 
capitalism. There is no transcendent politics which is not a nostalgic romantic 
anti-capitalism (localism or a desire to return to nature, to pre-capitalism). Any 
worthwhile political critique of capitalism must be immanent. It must show how 
capitalism distorts everyday life reducing it to less than it could be by decreasing the 
very potential of both human beings and the planet on which they exist. 
In the notes at the end of ‘Capitalism and Religion’, Benjamin writes about the 
mood of capitalism as being one of ‘worry’ (Sorge) (Benjamin, 2004, p. 290). Such 
worry is the opposite of hope. Its origin is a communal despair brought about through 
debt. Benjamin was not the only one who was writing about moods in the 1920s. 
Heidegger too spoke of worry and anxiety. In Being and Time, anxiety is the 
fundamental mood because it reveals the nothingness at the heart of human existence, 
such that none of us truly belong to this world, and we are all, ontologically speaking, 
 
 
6 ‘Born out of the horror and destruction that was Jewish history in our generation, it is bound to history 
itself and not meta-history; it has not given itself up totally to Messianism.’ (Scholem, 1995, p. 36) 
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permanently homeless (Heidegger, 1962, pp. 228–35). In lectures just after Being and 
Time called The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude and Solitude, 
we are no longer anxious but bored and the mood of our of age, boredom, is not 
individual but communal. We have, as Heidegger says, become a slave of our everyday 
occupations (Heidegger, 1995, p. 129). It is not something particular which is boring, 
nor even ourselves, rather everything has become boring. Yet this ‘everything’ is 
indeterminate and impersonal, just as the German phrase, Heidegger reminds us, es ist 
einem langweilig (‘it’s boring’, or ‘it is boring for one’), is (Heidegger, 1995, 
pp. 134–5). 
What characterises moods is that they pervade the whole of existence giving it 
its particular tone and quality. What is or are the mood or moods of today? Is it still 
boredom, as Heidegger asserts? We do not have to agree with Heidegger completely, 
and there is still a latent romanticism here, since for him it is about snatching the 
authentic moment out of the general banality of life. Paolo Virno describes the moods 
of late capitalism as opportunism and cynicism, which we might say are particular 
kinds of boredom, when boredom defines everything that decreases the power to exist 
(Virno, 2004, pp. 84–8). He adds, and this is the decisive point, it is not just these 
moods themselves which are significant, but the ‘neutral core’ from which they spring. 
This is why we should not immediately think of these moods in a negative way, as 
though asserting their opposites were possible, and it were simply a matter of becoming 
patient, loyal and steadfast in order to resist nihilism. Any alternatives can only be 
uncovered in the common source from which they spring, which is the everyday. We 
have to find in opportunism and cynicism different possibilities and not merely their 
opposite. 
In modern capitalism, there is no separation between work and life. Everything 
that would have been devoted to life now finds its place within work. Our ordinary 
abilities are precisely what are cultivated in the production process: speaking, 
gossiping, chatting, imagining, creating, and dreaming. The list is endless. The most 
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important skill of the worker is flexibility and mobility. Such is the source of 
opportunism. You must be ready to seize your chance. This talent is not merely 
restricted to the workplace. It is socially pervasive. This is why it expresses itself as a 
general mood. You already have to be opportunistic before you enter the workplace and 
not after, and such opportunism invades every aspect of our lives (even our relations to 
ourselves). There are no solid foundations, you must keep changing and reinventing 
yourself. Unlike Heidegger’s anxiety, this is not experienced as an uprooting of 
existence. Opportunism is the banality of the professionalization of life. That you are 
flexible, uprooted, heimatlos, is something you celebrate in your CV, and you do not 
lose sleep over it. Opportunism is the very opposite of anxiety. It is its familiarisation, 
as though anxiety had become the everyday rather than its opposite. Cynicism too, 
Virno, continues, has its origin in the general instability of life in late capitalism. It 
arises from our proximity to the rules of the game which we know are completely 
artificial. All there is are games in which we find ourselves immersed and which, if we 
want to be successful, we must play by the rules, even if we know they are arbitrary. We 
have not chosen to be in this game, rather this game has already chosen us, and to leave 
it is just to enter another with equally arbitrary rules. 
Neither of these two moods can be surmounted, just as much as we cannot jump 
out of the everyday. We cannot appeal to life beyond capitalism, because life and  the 
productive process has become completely enmeshed. We do not stop being cynical 
and opportunistic when we get home, because this is a general mood we carry around 
with us. Life is not beyond capitalism, but outside of it. It is in their common neutral 
core that we can see a different possibility and which can switch these two moods in a 
different direction. Being opportunistic is being open to the possible as far as possible 
(even though this flexibility is exploited by capitalism), and being cynical is 
recognising the conventionality of rules such that one can invent one’s own (even 
though this conventionality is converted into conformism by capitalism). In each case, 
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it is a question of turning around what is already there in a different direction back to 
their neutrality before they have been appropriated by capitalism.  
How can we understand this neutrality? It is the anonymity of the everyday life. 
Before I speak, it speaks. As Virno remarks, when it comes to Heidegger, this 
anonymity is something one should resist. You should speak in you own name, and not 
in that of those nameless others. Thus, idle speech and curiosity are examples of 
inauthentic existence, but for Virno they are where we might find a common and 
everyday resistance to capital. ‘I am tempted to say that idle talk,’ he writes, ‘resembles 
background noise’, and adds, ‘yet it offers a sketch from which significant variances, 
unusual modulations, sudden articulations can be derived.’ (Virno, 2004, p. 90). 
As Blanchot writes in ‘Everyday Speech’, this anonymity is the most difficult 
phenomenon to capture (Blanchot, 1993, pp. 238–45). As soon as we speak of it, it 
disappears. This is why the only way we can think of it is through moods, because like 
them it is so amorphous and indistinct. It is everything we are at any time, whether we 
are at work or at home, awake of asleep. In this sense, it has nothing at all to do with 
truth or history, but precisely because of this it can interrupt and disrupt them, yet only 
from its absolute weakness rather than strength. It escapes the law because the universal 
cannot reach it in its exhausted and pathetic particularity which does not even reach the 
level of the individual. The subject of the everyday, as we know from Heidegger, is 
anyone at all, but no one in particular: indifferently different, but for this very reason 
always an object of suspicion of any power. The everyday is not just a statistical mass 
of information about the ordinary activities of society, but the very opposite of society. 
Only in the ordinary we will find any resistance to society and nowhere else. From the 
side of power, it is seen as the most banal and sordid, but on from its perspective, it 
always escapes the structures of political society, and does so precisely because of its 
insignificance. This is no more so than in the case of communication, where we are 
bombarded daily with noise and images, but none of this means anything and does not 
seem to be spoken by anyone. Yet only in this cacophony can what is new emerge, 
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rather than from the institutions of society. The very indistinctness and impersonality of 
the ordinary, the very fact that it never reaches the lofty heights of truth and history, is 
what permits them to be interrupted and forestalled, and something new to enter into 
time. 
What we become in the everyday is the anonymous. We are stripped of our 
personality, anything that would make us stand out from within the crowd. We are just 
like everyone else, and everyone else is just like us, nobody and everybody. The 
everyday ruins and dissolves every structure and institution, even though they have 
their origin there. From the side of the subject, this anonymity is felt as negative, such 
as in Heidegger’s description of boredom, but from the side of the other, it is what strips 
it of any attribute or predication. It is what permits the other to remain other and to resist 
its appropriation by capital. The everyday, as Blanchot adds, belongs to the street where 
what is said is spoken by nobody, or no one owns up to what is spoken. You might think 
of such a speech as being fundamentally irresponsible, since no one bears witness to 
what they say, and as such it is the very opposite of sincerity. This is why the initial 
rumour of the street can easily become public opinion and propaganda manipulated by 
the politician, and what was formless and unorganised stratify into the most debased 
values and morality, which in turn legitimate violence against the very anonymity from 
which they emerged. Yet one can think of the absence of any subject not negatively but 
positively, or at least as a positivity preceding negation. The absence of the subject is 
not just the They, as Heidegger believed, but is this experience of the other: the other 
which has no name and is without identity. Neither the self, nor the other, if one thinks 
of the other as merely an other individual, but utterly anonymous and belonging to the 
streets, an indefinite presence of indeterminate possibilities. From the side of the 
individual such an experience might be terrifying, but one should not underestimate the 
corrosive force of this uncertainty, which is far more powerful than any heroic act. It is 
these streets Blanchot will find again in May 68. ‘It was not even a question of 
overthrowing an old world,’ he wrote later; ‘what mattered was to let a possibility 
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manifest itself, the possibility – beyond any utilitarian gain – of a being-together that 
gave back to all the right to equality in fraternity through the freedom of speech that 
elated everyone.’ [Emphasis in the original. Translation modified] (Blanchot, 1988, 
p. 30) 
 
6. The Hidden Messiah 
There is a story about the Messiah that it in these streets where He will be found, 
outside of the city, and with the anonymous rag-tag of society. There are two accounts 
of the arrival of the Messiah in Judaism. One is that it can be calculated and the other 
that it cannot. For the latter account, it is said that the Messiah could arrive at any 
instant. It is such a tale, as we have seen, to which Benjamin alludes to in the ‘Theses’. 
If the Messiah can arrive at any moment, then there can be no preparation. Waiting for 
the Messiah, then, would not be expectation, a prolongation or expansion of the present 
into the future, but its disruption. The Messianic moment is not a moment within time, 
it does not follow the normal course of events, but is outside of time. ‘He comes 
suddenly,’ Scholem writes, ‘unannounced, and precisely when he is least expected or 
when hope has long been abandoned.’ (Scholem, 1995, p. 11) This impossibility of 
putting a precise date on the arrival of the Messiah led to the stories in the Aggadah of 
the occultation of the Messiah. The Messiah had already arrived and could be anyone 
and perhaps even unknown to himself. The most extreme form of this story is the idea 
of the Messiah living with the lepers and beggars in front of the gates of Rome 
(Sanhedrin 98). When the Rabbi Joshua b. Levi asks this Messiah when He will come, 
He replies ‘today’.  
The Messianic is found where you might least expect it. Outside the walls of the 
city with the destitute and homeless, those who are most exiled from the centre of 
power. It belongs not to the ‘most high’, but to the ordinary and everyday. It is not 
above or beyond time, but alongside it accompanying it in every instant. Alongside, 
however, does not mean contemporaneous. It is not one more instant added onto all the 
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others. This is how I understand the occultation of the arrival of the Messiah. It cannot 
be foretold because it is does not belong to the flow of time. It is not because this event 
is so surprising or mysterious or even unexpected, in the ordinary sense of this term, 
that I cannot know when the Messiah arrives, but because it does not belong to order or 
sequence of events at all. It has always already happened or not happened. ‘Today,’ the 
Messiah replies to Rabbi Joshua b. Levi, but he does not believe Him and complains to 
Elijah that He has lied to him. Elijah responds ‘Today, if you will hear his voice’.7 In 
the word ‘today’, I hear the ordinary, the most ordinary of the ordinary, and perhaps, in 
that sense, not ordinary at all. What is actual today is the subsumption of capital. Yet 
there are always other possibilities which do not belong to this actuality, and these 
possibilities are always the most ordinary, more ordinary than everything else: ‘beneath 
the pavement, the beach’, as one of the slogans of May ‘68 says.8 Such moments, I 
would say, are Messianic. They reveal, if only for an instant, that the smooth flow of 
time is a lie, and underneath the monotony of the actual present, lies the future which is 
neither mine nor yours, but anyone’s. What is certain is if there is no such future, if 
there is no interrogation and resistance to cult of capital, then all that awaits us is an 
oncoming disaster, whose time of arrival we cannot know.
 
 
7 There is even the story that the Messiah has come but we have not noticed because the redeemed world 
is so little different from this one, but none the less it is still redeemed if only one could see. 
8 Written anonymously by the Comité d’ Action Etudiants-Ecrivains, of which Blanchot and Duras, 
amongst many others, were participants. 
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